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ARTICLE
BALANCING JUSTICE NEEDS AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY IN CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS
PROVISIONS:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INDIA,
AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED STATES
Krithika Ashok, * Paul T. Babie, ** & John V. Orth ***
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the relationship between justice needs and
private property in the constitutional takings provisions of the Indian,
Australian, and American constitutions. Building upon established
scholarship, it develops a theoretical framework within which to
consider the way in which a state balances the requirement to provide
minimal levels of justice for its citizens through the re-distribution of
goods and resources with the need to protect the private property of
individuals. We summarize this framework in what we refer to as the
“Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property Continuum.” Using the
framework developed, the Article provides an outline of the takings
provisions found in the Indian, Australian, and American constitutions.
Part I examines Article 300A of the Constitution of India, which
contains the scope of the power of compulsory acquisition exercised by
the Indian state. Part II assesses Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian
Constitution which, unlike its American and Indian counterparts,
operates as both a grant of power to the federal government, as well as
a limitation imposed upon that power, which may, it seems, operate so
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as to provide some minimal protection for individual private property
interests. Part III considers the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution which, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, provides perhaps the most robust means among the three
jurisdictions considered for protecting the individual private property
interests as against state takings. The Conclusion offers comparative
reflections on the nature of the takings provision found in each
jurisdiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every system of government implements a means of allocating
scarce goods and resources amongst its citizens. Political theory,
starting with Plato, addresses this allocative question as part of the
overarching mechanism of governance, typically referring to whatever
means are adopted as a system of property. 1 For the most part, that subset of political theory known as property theory has developed idealtypical forms of property, generally known as private, state-public, and
common. 2 Virtually all such theorizing fixes the theoretical substantive
content of these ideal types and, having done so, offers some
justification for the allocation of scarce resources according to one of
the ideal types. 3 Property theory, then, concerns itself with the
substantive content of and justifications for the implementation of the
ideal types in a given system of governance, be it capitalist or
socialist/communist, or some hybrid of the two. And every system of
1. See generally JEFFREY ABRAMSON, MINERVA’S OWL: THE TRADITION OF WESTERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2010); J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996).
2. For more on the content of these ideal-typic forms, see generally Paul T. Babie, John
V. Orth, & Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, The Honoré-Waldron Thesis: A Comparison of the Blend
of Ideal-Typic Categories of Property in American, Chinese and Australian Land Law, 91
TULANE L. REV. 739 (2017).
3. For justifications typically given for property, see generally BRUCE H ZIFF, PRINCIPLES
OF PROPERTY LAW (7th ed., 2018).
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governance exhibits some blend of the ideal types; this is known as its
system of property, which tends to become a part of its legal structure.
The theory of property, when so implemented, becomes the state’s law
of property. 4
As part of a state’s law of property, some consideration is
typically also given to the re-allocation or re-distribution of goods and
resources initially allocated to others according to law, so as to meet
some minimal level of justice for all citizens. J.W. Harris refers to this
dimension of property law as its “[e]xpropriation [r]ules,” “whereby
part or all of the privileges and powers constituting a person’s
ownership of something may be stripped from him against his will.”5
The state may establish such rules as a means of enforcing the payment
of debts in processes of civil execution or bankruptcy, or as part of
family law, or criminal law, or, as part of equity, as a means of
preventing unconscionable conduct. 6 But “[m]ost significantly of all,
the governments of modern States have asserted the power, enshrined
in law, to tax money and other property-holdings owned by citizens,
and to purchase property-holdings compulsorily.” 7 The reason for such
rules is simply because “[i]f property institutions are justifiable at all,
then at least some of the rules whereby what a person owns may be
taken from him against his will are justified. . . . [because] justice has
inevitable costs.” 8
For Harris, “justice costs” are those which arise as part of a
community’s “obligations to discharge basic needs,” and may be of two
types: direct and indirect. 9 In the former category, one finds those
arrangements that emerge when “citizens or groups . . . , in justice,
demand . . . from their fellows . . . that they not be subjected to
unprovoked violence, [which gives rise to the] . . . need [for]
legislators, prosecutors, police, soldiers, judges, and social workers.”10
The most practical method of providing for such services is through
expropriatory taxation of money for the payment of salaries. 11 Indirect
justice costs, by contrast, include “collective goods,” such as roads,
parks, museums, and so forth, and basic needs, such as those provided
4. For more on this blend, see Babie, Orth, & Weng, supra note 2.
5. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 37.
6. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 37, 38.
7. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 38.
8. See HARRIS, supra note 1,
9. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 279.
10. See HARRIS, supra note 1,
11. See HARRIS, supra note 1, at 280.
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for in Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which reads:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control. 12

The justice costs of a state, therefore, both direct and indirect,
must be met through Harris’s expropriation rules, which allow for some
re-allocation or re-distribution of existing property holdings to the
state. And while every state accomplishes such re-allocation
differently, two typical features emerge. First, one finds some form of
paramount law, usually in a constitution, which provides for a
balancing of the interests/rights of those whose property interests are
taken, expropriated or compulsorily acquired by the state with those of
the state in meeting its justice costs. And, second, having provided the
means by which the competing interests involved in an expropriation,
the constitution or other paramount law establishes the branch of
government charged with mediating disputes between the property
holder whose interest is taken and the state in seeking to meet its justice
costs through the application of the constitutional provision so
established for that purpose. Most states task the judicial branch with
this mediating role. The role of the courts, in every jurisdiction which
provides for governmental action so as to redistribute property to meet
the minimal requirements of justice, is, as Justice Kennedy recently
wrote, “to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.’” 13
What emerges, then, is a tension between, on the one hand, the
power of the state to take property interests so as to meet its minimal
justice (direct and indirect) costs, and, on the other, the protection of
private property interests held by citizens. We plot those two positions
at opposite ends of a Continuum. 14 The closer a state moves, in its
paramount law (i.e., its constitution) and its law of property towards
12. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (Dec. 10,
1948).
13. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
14. See infra Diagram 1.
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either end of the Continuum, the greater the paramountcy a state places
on that interest: either meeting the justice needs of the community as a
whole, at one end of the Continuum, or providing strong protection for
individual private property interests, at the other. We call that end of
the Continuum where paramountcy is given to the state’s power
compulsorily to acquire a “Strong Power of the State Compulsorily to
Acquire Property to Meet Justice Needs,” and that position at the
opposite end a “Strong Protection for Private Property.” The center of
the Continuum is that position where there is a balance between the
two, and therefore we refer to that as the “Balance Between the State’s
Power Compulsorily to Acquire Property to Meet Justice Needs and
the Protection of Private Property.”
Any state can be plotted along this Continuum, at least initially,
on the basis solely of its paramount law and its law of property. But
once that initial position is established, a state may adjust that position
through the interpretation of its paramount law and its law of property
by government. This may occur through any of executive, legislative,
or judicial activity of the state in question; most typically, though,
judicial interpretation and application of the paramount law and the law
of property results in the most dramatic shifts of placement on the
Continuum. Of course, because judicial interpretations and
applications change over time, a state’s precise placement along the
Continuum remains in constant flux depending on a then contemporary
interpretative approach regarding the paramount law and the law of
property. We call this the “Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property
Continuum.”

Diagram 1. Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property
Continuum
In this Article, we compare the placement of three constitutional
federal democracies—India, Australia, and the United States—along
the Continuum, revealing the ways in which the judiciary balances the
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need for governmental action to redistribute goods and resources so as
to meet minimal community justice needs/costs as against the
individual rights established by the property law of the state in those
goods and resources. In each case, two outcomes follow: first, the
relevant constitution contains a provision which establishes the form of
protection for the established individual property interests of citizens
combined with some criteria which must be met if the state is to take,
expropriate, or compulsorily acquire either the goods or resources the
subject of the individual property rights or the property rights
themselves; and, second, the judiciary, through its interpretations of
that constitutional provision, adjusts the balance between the two
interests of the individual and the state. In our conclusion, we indicate
where, generally, each of the jurisdictions considered here might fall
along the Continuum, given the initial placement through the
constitutional provision and its interpretation by one or more of the
other branches of government.
While we provide a brief overview of the operation of the relevant
constitutional provisions in India, Australia, and the United States, our
primary focus is the purpose for which property in land may be taken
by the state (although the approach is generally also applicable to other
forms of property, both tangible and intangible). Each nation deals
differently with the question of purpose, thus providing rich
comparative detail to the variable ways in which a state balances the
need to meet minimal justice needs/costs against the protection of
individual private property. Each jurisdiction uses different
nomenclature to define what Harris refers to as the stripping of property
interests from an individual for the purpose of meeting a state’s
minimal justice needs/costs. In the United States, this is referred to as
a “taking,” 15 while in India and Australia, a “compulsory acquisition”
(or sometimes “expropriation”). 16 While both terms mean the same
thing, so as not to alter beyond recognition the language familiar to
people in each of those jurisdictions, we use the relevant nomenclature
for the state’s stripping of individual private property interests for the
15. See generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying
Principles--Part I--A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1299
(1989); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles--Part II-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property without Moral Justification, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
53 (1990).
16. For India, see generally P. K. SARKAR, LAW OF ACQUISITION OF LAND IN INDIA
(2008). For Australia, see generally MARCUS JACOBS, LAW OF COMPULSORY LAND
ACQUISITION (2d ed., 2015).
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jurisdiction under discussion. Thus, to be clear, when speaking of the
relevant law for the United States, we use “taking,” of India and
Australia, “compulsory acquisition” or “expropriation”; but in doing
so, in each case, we mean the state’s stripping of individual private
property interests or the goods and resources subject to them so as to
meet minimal justice needs/costs.
The Article contains four parts. Part I examines Article 300A of
the Constitution of India (“Indian Constitution”), which contains the
scope of the power of compulsory acquisition exercised by the Indian
state. While the Indian Constitution originally sought to protect
individual property rights, much like the US Constitution, gradually,
the need to undertake social and economic reform—justice needs—
began to take precedence over individual rights. This led to a dilution
of the constitutional protections for individual property rights, but
without simultaneously instituting a system of accountability to ensure
that the state serves genuine justice needs when exercising its broad
powers to acquire land. We see that the Indian position on the
Continuum is a product of both judicial interpretation and application
and legislative refinement.
Part II assesses Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution
which, unlike its American counterpart, operates as both a grant of
power to the Commonwealth or federal government, as well as a
limitation imposed upon that power which may, it seems, operate so as
to provide some minimal protection for individual private property
interests. We say minimal protection because the limitation, unlike the
Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, is at least formally
considered a limitation on legislative competence rather than as an
individual right. Australia’s approach—seemingly favoring the
community and its justice needs/costs—emerges entirely from judicial
interpretation and application.
Part III considers the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the US Constitution (“Takings Clause”) which, as interpreted by the
US Supreme Court, provides perhaps the most robust means among the
three jurisdictions considered for protecting the individual private
property interests as against state takings. Like Australia, this position
has been reached almost entirely as a consequence of judicial
interpretation and application of the Takings Clause.
Our Conclusion offers comparative reflections on the nature of the
constitutional provision found in each jurisdiction, suggesting a
placement on the Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property
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Continuum, bearing in mind, of course, that our placements are nothing
more than a tentative and contingent suggestion, given the potential for
ongoing shifts due to changing interpretation and application of the
relevant constitutional protection and the property law of the state. As
we noted above, the placement of each of the states considered here
and, indeed, of any state which might be plotted along the Continuum,
is in constant flux.
II. INDIA: ARTICLE 300A
The right to property in India is, at present, protected under Article
300A of the Indian Constitution, which provides that “no person shall
be deprived of their property, save by authority of law.” 17 A literal
reading of this constitutional provision suggests an intention to protect
the landowner only from executive fiat, imposing minimal restrictions
on the power of the state to acquire land. This is in sharp contrast to the
language adopted in the Indian Constitution in 1950. At that time, the
Indian Constitution explicitly made the exercise of eminent domain
subject to the twin requirements of public purpose and compensation.
Article 31 provided, in addition to the requirement that a law be
enacted, that “no property . . . shall be acquired for public purposes . . .
unless the law provides for compensation.” 18 This provision however
became the subject of a series of legal and political battles, as a result
of which the language of this provision underwent several changes at
the hands of the legislature through constitutional amendments. 19 At
their core, these battles represented the clash between the reform
agenda of a newly constituted, socialist state on the one hand, and
individual property rights on the other. They culminated eventually, in
1978, with the right to property being relegated to the status of a mere
statutory right. 20 In other words, the preconditions for the exercise of
eminent domain were now to be dictated by statute alone, the
enactment of which being the only mandate under Article 300A of the
Indian Constitution.
The primary rationale behind this amendment was to protect the
remaining fundamental rights, 21 a need that arose out of the back-and17. INDIA CONST. art. 300A.
18. INDIA CONST. art. 31.
19. Namita Wahi, Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION,
943-44 (Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016).
20. INDIA CONST., amended by The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
21. See GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 421 (1999).
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forth, during the same time, between the judiciary and legislature on
the breadth of the powers of the latter to amend the Indian Constitution.
In the aftermath of the Emergency, 22 the successor government was
amenable to imposing some limits on the power of the legislature to
amend the Indian Constitution, particularly the fundamental rights. 23 It
however felt very differently about the right to property, 24 to protect
which—worse, equate it with other fundamental rights—was thought
decidedly anti-poor. 25 This ultimately led to the withdrawal of the
constitutional protection that had been accorded to property rights.
In recent times, however, compulsory acquisition, particularly for
industry and infrastructure, has resulted in widespread displacement
among tribal and other economically marginalized communities; and
has thus also been a major source of political conflict. There has
evidently been a shift in the priorities of the Indian state in terms of
allocation of resources, with the gradual shift away from socialism; but
it is the permissive attitude of the judiciary that has made it possible to
accommodate such diverse priorities. To illustrate this, we focus on the
judicial construction of “public purpose,” a prerequisite for the exercise
of eminent domain. We suggest that the judiciary, by allowing the
legislature the sole prerogative of defining public purpose, has failed to
ensure that the dilution of property rights is accompanied by allocation
of resources to genuine justice requirements.
The judiciary is called upon to decide on the meaning of “public
purpose” both when the constitutional validity of land acquisition
legislation is in question, as well as when examining whether executive
action is within the strictures of the authorizing law. In relation to the
first task, “public purpose” has been read into Article 300A as a
precondition for a law that deprives a person of their property to be
valid; 26 and before that, it was explicitly stated as a condition under

22. In 1975, Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of Emergency in India, quick on the heels of the
Allahabad HC invalidating her election. During this time, Mrs. Gandhi’s government introduced
a series of constitutional amendments to protect her own election from challenge and ‘to trim’
the judiciary. Most significantly, the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976
introduced an amendment to shield all constitutional amendments from judicial review,
nullifying therefore the decision in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, which laid down
the ‘basic structure’ doctrine. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 370–74.
23. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 421–26.
24. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 421–26.
25. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 425–26.
26. K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (India).
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Article 31(2) of the Indian Constitution. 27 As a result, any legislation
that authorizes the acquisition of land can be challenged as
unconstitutional, if it does not serve any legitimate public purpose.28
Nonetheless, if one examines the history of the Supreme Court of India
(“SCI”), it would be apparent that there have been only a few cases
where the constitutionality of the legislation has been challenged
successfully, on the grounds that it does not serve any public purpose.29
In other words, the public purpose requirement has not constrained the
ability of the state to flex its eminent domain muscles.
The primary reason is that acquisition laws in India have largely
been made immune to judicial review through a series of constitutional
amendments. 30 This may appear paradoxical at first, but the fledgling
Indian state, conceived as one with a socialist bent,31 aspired to
undertake agrarian reform, in addition to nationalizing key industries.
Individual property rights were therefore seen as a hindrance, and
subservient to the aspiration reflected in the Indian Constitution, to
achieve social and economic justice—the justice requirements. This
sentiment was seen in the introduction of Articles 31A, 31B and 31C,
the scope of which we discuss below.
Nearly as soon as the Indian Constitution was adopted, feudal
landlords began to employ the individual rights guaranteed thereunder
so as to resist the efforts of the state to acquire land that was not
personally cultivated by them for the purpose of redistribution among
the landless tillers. These land reforms were aimed particularly at
putting an end to the exploitative revenue system that was in place
during British rule; which permitted landlords to impose exorbitant
revenue rates on the tillers (often through layers of parasitical
intermediaries), even while they paid tax at fixed rate. 32 To ensure that
these acquisition laws were not struck down by the judiciary, the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 introduced Article 31A, to
shield land reform laws from constitutional challenge, and Article 31B,
27. State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCR 889 (India); INDIA CONST.,
amended by The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.
28. INDIA CONST. arts. 32, 226.
29. NAMITA WAHI, ANKIT BHATIA, ET AL., LAND ACQUISITION IN INDIA: A REVIEW OF
SUPREME COURT CASES FROM 1950 TO 2016 (2017), at 26.
30. P.K. Tripathi, Right to Property after 44th Amendment - Better Protected than Ever
Before, AIR 49, 51 (1980).
31. AUSTIN, supra note 22, at 425-26.
32. Sukumar Das, A Critical Evaluation of Land Reforms in India (1950-1995), in 5 LAND
REFORMS IN INDIA: AN UNFINISHED AGENDA, 30 (B.K. Sinha & Pushpendra eds., 2000).

2019]

BALANCING JUSTICE NEEDS

1009

to protect any law incorporated into the Ninth Schedule of the Indian
Constitution by a constitutional amendment. 33 Article 31C was
introduced later, through the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment)
Act, 1971 (but again, in furtherance of the socialist objectives of the
Indian state); 34 and explicitly saves laws directed at furthering
particular Directive Principles of State Policy, 35 namely redistribution
of resources and prevention of concentration of wealth. 36 Therefore,
interestingly, the Indian Constitution itself provided for the justice
requirements that limited individual property rights.
The result was the SCI has hardly had opportunity to closely
scrutinize land acquisition laws, whether to determine the underlying
public purpose or otherwise, even at a time when property rights
received constitutional protection. Moreover, the result of these
exemptions (although of noble intention) has been to aid in cultivating,
over time, a rather permissive attitude within the judiciary towards
compulsory acquisition by the state. Therefore, an examination of the
jurisprudence on eminent domain reveals that even before Article 31(2)
was deleted from the Indian Constitution, the right to property (or any
of the other fundamental rights, such as equality and liberty, in their
application to land acquisition) was denuded of much substance. Even
in the rare case where the judiciary had opportunity to examine whether
the land acquisition law satisfies the public purpose requirement, it
chose to defer to the legislature on principle. It consistently maintained,
from State of Bihar v. Maharaja Kameshwar Singh, 37 the earliest case
on eminent domain, to KT Plantation v. State of Karnataka, 38 that the
33. INDIA CONST. art. 31A, amended by The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951;
INDIA CONST. art. 31B, amended by The Constitution (Ninth Schedule) Act, 1955.
34. INDIA CONST. art. 31C, amended by The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act,
1971.
35. The Directive Principles of State Policy were principles meant to guide the governance
of the country, and are therefore not justiciable. They reflect the socialist and revolutionary
content of the Constitution.
36. INDIA CONST. art. 31C. Article 39 of the Constitution of India states:
Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State: The State shall, in particular,
direct its policy towards securing: [ . . . ] (b) that the ownership and control of the
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to sub-serve the
common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment [ . . . ].
INDIA CONST. art. 39.
37. See State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCR 889 (India).
38. See K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (India).
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legislature is the best judge of the meaning of public purpose, and
absolved itself of the burden of defining the term. The SCI, suggesting
that it would be “undesirable” to define public purpose, 39 only ever
attempted define public purpose in the most general terms—as a
purpose that is beneficial to the community, 40 or that which is not
private. 41 In other words, the judiciary has failed to discharge its
obligation to mediate the competing interests involved in
expropriation. This also left future courts without any conceptual
understanding of the term public purpose, and kept the state
permanently free from scrutiny. Further, considering that the chief
protocol in the reasoning employed by the courts has been deference to
the legislature, its explication of the so-called public purpose served by
the law at hand has also often been based on, not any a priori
understanding of the term, but simply the claims of the legislature. It
would therefore also be inappropriate to treat any of these cases as
carrying any precedential value on the question of what is public
purpose.
This permissive attitude of the judiciary is seen not only in its
treatment of the question of public purpose, but also in its interpretation
of the scope of exemption provisions. For instance, in KT Plantation v.
State of Karnataka, 42 the SCI when interpreting the immunity granted
under Article 31A to laws authorizing the acquisition of estates, the
court gave an expansive reading to the term “agrarian reforms” to
include the mere preservation and protection of the rich forestry and
cultivation on privately owned land. 43 It was all the more curious
considering that the objects and reasons stated in the law in question
suggested an equally, if not greater, concern for preserving valuable
paintings and artifacts that were also on the premises. Similarly, the
SCI has been loath to interfere with the operation of Article 31B,
despite the immense possibility of abuse. 44 At the time of its
introduction, the Ninth Schedule was populated with a short list of
thirteen land reform laws. 45 It has now expanded to a list of over two

39. See Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552 (India).
40. See Somavanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 S.C.R. (3) 774; see also Sooraram Pratap
Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552 (India).
41. See State of Bombay v. R.S. Nanji, (1956) SCR 18 (India).
42. See KT Plantation v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 (India).
43. Id.
44. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 (India).
45. Wahi, supra note 19.
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hundred laws, 46 several of which do not pertain to land reform. While
the SCI did decide that the laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule could
not alter the “basic structure” 47 of the Indian Constitution, 48 it did not
impose any criteria that must be fulfilled by the law to justify its
insertion in the Ninth Schedule. 49 Moreover, the laws inserted in the
schedule before 1973, when the basic structure doctrine was
propounded, cannot be challenged on any grounds. 50 The SCI was
unwilling to “[upset] settled claims and titles” and it was hardly any
consolation that, in the opinion of the court, laws from that period
“mostly pertain to laws of agrarian reform.” 51
With Article 31C, once again, it is seen that the SCI has been
lenient towards the state in its interpretation of the scope of Article 31C.
For instance, in Bhim Singhji v. Union of India, 52 the court was easily
satisfied that the acquisition of property held in excess of a prescribed
ceiling limit deserved the protection of Article 31C. 53 However, it did
not consider that the enactment simultaneously empowered the
government to dispose the land thus acquired “for any purpose relating
to or connected with industry . . . .” Except for Justice Talzapurkar,
none of the judges saw this provision as militating against the very
purpose, the justice requirement, sought to be protected by Article
31C. 54
In addition to examining the constitutional validity of land
acquisition laws, the judiciary is also tasked with examining whether
executive action taken to acquire land is within the strictures of the
46. INDIA CONST. art 31B.
47. While the constitutional provision on the powers of the Parliament to amend the Indian
Constitution does not specify any limits on their amending powers, the SCI in Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala laid down that certain basic features of the Indian Constitution cannot
be altered. AIR 1973 SC 1461. In the past, the SCI has decided that, for instance, secularism,
democracy, judicial review, and rule of law are part of the basic structure of the Indian
Constitution. The right to property, however, has never been considered part of the basic
structure. Hence with respect to the laws inserted in the Ninth Schedule, it is only when it
violates the “essence” of the right to equality, the right to life or individual liberties that it can
be struck down. See generally Madhav Khosla, Constitutional Amendment, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 232-250 (Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap
Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016).
48. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861 (India).
49. Id.
50. Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 362 (India).
51. Id at 397.

52. (1981) 1 SCC 166 (India).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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authorizing law. A holistic understanding of the jurisprudence of Indian
eminent domain, then, requires an examination of the manner in which
the judiciary interprets these laws, particularly, their definition of
public purpose. It is not possible here to examine all of these acquisition
laws; instead, we focus on the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“LAA
1894”), 55 for two main reasons: first, most acquisition of land by the
Indian state has taken place under this law; and, second, the law is of
colonial heritage, and arguably carries with it a certain conviction in
the legitimacy, and breadth, of the power of the state to acquire land. It
was only recently that the LAA 1894 was replaced by the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“LARR 2013”). 56 The LARR 2013 is
considered to be somewhat friendly to the interests of landowners,
when compared to the LAA 1894, 57 even though it does not
significantly alter the balance of powers between the state and
landowners. 58
The LAA 1894 contains a definition of public purpose and
requires that before the government acquire land for its own use, it be
satisfied that the land is required “for a public purpose.” 59 Despite this,
the law barely acted as a restraint on the ability of the government to
acquire private lands. 60 This was because it contained a rather broad
definition of public purpose, which “included” inter alia planned
development, town planning, and residential purposes, for carrying out
health and education schemes, and for a state-owned corporation or
public office. 61 The SCI therefore promptly held that the definition is
an inclusive one. 62 In fact, one could go so far as to argue that the
statutory definition is not of any relevance, considering the frequent
55. Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India).
56. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013, No. 30, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).
57. Wahi, supra note 19.
58. Usha Ramanathan, Land Acquisition, Eminent Domain and the 2011 Bill, (2011)
46(44–5) ECON. & POL. WKLY., 10–4 (2011); Mihir Desai, Land Acquisition Law and the
Proposed Challenges, 46(26–27) ECON. & POL. WKLY., 95–100 (2011); Michael Levien,
Rationalising Dispossession: The Land Acquisition and Resettlement Bills, 46(11) ECONOMIC
& POLITICAL WEEKLY, 66–71 (2011).
59. Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India),
§ 3(f).
60. Sebastian Morris & Ajay Pandey, Towards Reform of Land Acquisition Framework in
India, 42(22) ECON. & POL. WKLY., 2083–90 (2007).
61. Section 3(f), Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
62. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 S.C.R. (3) 774.
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suggestion from the judiciary that public purpose is not static and
cannot be defined, 63 even when dealing with cases under the LAA
1894. Furthermore, once again, we see that the judiciary has been loath
to interfere with the determination of public purpose made by the
government. 64 This is also the result of the statutory presumption,
under Section 6(3), that a declaration by the government that the land
is required for a public purpose will be conclusive evidence of the
same. 65 Accordingly, the courts have held that the question of “public
purpose” is not justiciable and is unwilling to intervene unless the
executive has acted in colorable exercise of its powers under the
legislation. 66
Not surprisingly, then, a recent study found that the SCI had
invalidated the acquisition of land for lacking a public purpose in only
thirteen of seventy-nine cases, in which this ground was raised, of a
total of 1,300 cases on land acquisition. 67 Thus, we see again that while
theoretically the state can only acquire private lands to serve a public
purpose, in practice, the state is not subject to judicial scrutiny on this
count, and barely held accountable. This perhaps was inevitable
considering that the law was drafted by a colonial state; yet, the LAA
1894 continued to operate for more than sixty years after India gained
independence in 1947 without shifting the balance of power away from
the state. Apart from the statutory presumption in favor of the
determination of public purpose made by the government, this point is
further established by the fact that the LAA 1894 seemingly permitted
acquisition of land other than for a public purpose. 68 Namely, the LAA
1894 provides that land may be acquired “for a public purpose or for a
company,” 69 and lays down a distinct procedure for each type of
acquisition. 70 While the “public process” procedure became applicable
when the acquisition was funded either wholly or in part by the state,
the procedure for the latter became applicable when the acquisition was

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
§ 3(f).

Daulat Singh Surana v. First Land Acquisition Collector, (2007) 1 SCC 641 (India).
Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 S.C.C. 552.
Somavanti v. State of Punjab, (1963) SCR (3) 774 (India).
Id.
See WAHI, supra note 29.
Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 1 SCC 728 (India).
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India).
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India),

1014 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

entirely funded by the acquiring company. 71 Either the LAA 1894 did
not perceive any contradiction between the muscle of the state being
employed to compel landowners to part with their property for a private
entity, and the doctrine of eminent domain; or it was never honestly
committed to the doctrine. The Punjab High Court, however, did notice
this contradiction and struck down the procedure for acquisition of land
for a company as being unconstitutional; suggesting that it had no
validity following the constitutional embargo on the acquisition of land
for a private purpose. 72 This decision was, though, reversed by the
SCI. 73
In part, the court relied on the observations in Babu Barkya
Thakur v. State of Bombay 74 that the LAA 1894 mandated that
acquisition of land for a company, under Part VII, serve some public
purpose. 75 This was drawn from a reading Sections 40 and 41 of the
LAA 1894, which required that the government execute an agreement
with the company to employ the land either to provide housing to its
workmen or for the construction of works that are likely to prove useful
to the public. 76 In any case, the court concluded that the LAA 1894 was
exempted under Article 31(5) of the Indian Constitution, as “existing
law,” from the twin requirements for the exercise of eminent domain.77
Therefore, if anything, the deletion of Article 31 pursuant to the FortyFourth Amendment, should have led to a reassessment of the validity
of the procedure for acquisition for a company under the LAA 1894.
The SCI did, though, attempt to partly restore balance when it
came to the power of the state to acquire land for a company by
interpreting the requirement under Section 40(b) of the LAA 1894, that
the “work [be] likely to prove useful to the public,” in a restrictive
manner. 78 It held that the requirement is fulfilled only if the public has
the right to use the work itself, and not merely the product of it. 79 In

71. Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India); Somawanti v. State of
Punjab, (1963) SCR (3) 774 (India); Pratibha Nema v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC
3140 (India).
72. Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India).
73. Id.
74. (1961) 1 SCR 128 (India).
75. Id.
76. Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India).
77. Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab, (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India).
78. R.L. Arora v. State of UP, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 149 (India).
79. Id.
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this decision of the court, which was celebrated in many quarters, 80 the
court refused to accept that the legislature could have intended that
individuals “be compelled to part with their lands for private profit of
others who might be owners of companies, through the Government,
simply because the company might produce goods which would be
useful to the public.” 81 The legislature quickly responded by amending
the LAA 1894 to include among the permitted uses for an acquiring
company, the “construction of some building or work for a company,
which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry
or work which is for a public purpose.” 82 The SCI however read the
requirement of public purpose as attaching to the work or building to
be constructed. 83 As a result, it was necessary to establish the public
purpose that would be served by the specific work or building to be
constructed by the company on the acquired land; it was not sufficient
to establish that the company, or the industry in which it operated, was
in the public interest. 84 As such, the judiciary rendered the “company”
route unattractive because it restricted the manner in which the
company could utilize the land.
While this may have been one step forward, the SCI quickly took
matters back by (more than) two steps with its decision in Somawanti
v. State of Punjab. 85 It reiterated that the determination of public
purpose by the government is not justiciable, but also it held that even
a nominal contribution to the acquisition cost by the state would be
sufficient for it to access the “public purpose” route. 86 This meant that
the state could acquire land for a company with effectively less scrutiny
under the “public purpose” route, and without the need to impose
conditions on the manner in which the land must be utilized. In this
decision, therefore, the SCI upheld an acquisition for setting up a
factory to manufacture refrigerator compressors, simply deferring to
the opinion of the government that it was a public utility. 87 This
decision was unfaithful to the presumption underlying the decisions in

80. Colin Gonsalves, Judicial Failure on Land Acquisitions for Companies, 45(32) ECON.
& POL. WKLY. 37–42 (2010).
81. R.L. Arora v. State of UP, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 149 (India).
82. Id.
83. R.L. Arora v. State of UP, (1964) 6 SCR 784 (India).
84. R.K. Agarwalla v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1965 SC 995 (India).
85. (1963) SCR (3) 774 (India).
86. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 SCR (3) 774 (India).
87. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, 1963 SCR (3) 774 (India).

1016 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:4

both Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab 88 and R.L. Arora v. State of
Bombay 89 that undertaking useful economic activity does not in itself
amount to public purpose. We see again, therefore, that the permissive
attitude of the judiciary predates the deletion of the constitutional
protection against arbitrary deprivation of property.
Thereafter, the SCI has on several occasions found land
acquisition for industrial development or for setting up of industrial
estates and parks as amounting to a public purpose, 90 regardless of
whether the immediate beneficiary is a private entity. 91 This has been
the outcome despite an amendment to the LAA 1894 in 1984 to exclude
“acquisition of land for a company” from the purview of the definition
of “public purpose” in Section 3(f). 92 In fact, the SCI suggested that
“facilitating the setting up of an industry in private sector [is] imbued
with the character of public purpose acquisition if the government
comes forward to sanction the payment of a nominal sum towards
compensation.” 93 As a result, the state has been described as an “estate
agent for companies” 94 In other words, we see that the expropriation
rules are relaxed to the extent that the state is able to exercise its powers
to serve private interests, rather than simply justice costs.
Recently, this issue was examined afresh in a challenge to the
acquisition of farmland in West Bengal, under the “public purpose”
route, for Tata Motors Limited to set-up a factory. 95 This particular land
acquisition had triggered a massive political conflict in the State, which
eventually forced the project to be relocated to the State of Gujarat.96
While the two-judge bench of the SCI invalidated the acquisition, both
judges proffered different reasons. Interestingly, Justice V. Gopal
Gowda concluded that the land was acquired entirely at the instance of
the company but “in the guise of an acquisition for public purpose.”97
Therefore, he invalidated the acquisition for not complying with the
88. (1961) 2 SCR 459 (India).
89. (1964) 6 SCR 784 (India).
90. Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, (1966) 3 SCR 885 (India); Narayan Govind
Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 (India).
91. State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, AIR 1955 SC 41 (India); Sooraram Pratap Reddy v.
District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552 (India).
92. Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984 (India),
§ 3.
93. Pratibha Nema v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2003 SC 3140 (India).
94. See Gonsalves, supra note 80.
95. Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal, (2017) 11 SCC 601 (India).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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requirements under the “company” route. He nonetheless “admitted”
that the acquisition of land to set up industrial units was
understandable, 98 only that he urged the state to strictly follow
procedure “where the brunt of this development is borne by the weakest
sections of the society.” 99
This also points to the rather spurious distinction that has been
created between the “private” and “public” spheres, for the sake of
defining public purpose. For instance, where local tradesmen were
being uprooted from their place of business, at a popular pilgrimage
site, for the safety and convenience of the devotees, 100 the court upheld
their eviction suggesting that private interest must give way to public
interest. 101 Similarly, in another case, the acquisition of land for setting
up a dockyard was upheld as being in the public interest, even though
several workers were losing their jobs as a result. 102 The absurdity of
the judicial construction of the “public” is perhaps most evident in
cases where the landowners have in turn argued that the land is already
being used for a similar public purpose. For instance, where land was
being acquired to set up a fertilizer factory (apparently a public
purpose), it was argued that the land was already being utilized for
manufacturing building material. 103 The courts, however, had
previously rejected similar arguments on the ground that it was the
prerogative of the state to prioritize different public utilities. 104
Further, it appears that the inchoate yet mythical nature of public
interest has largely permitted the state to conflate the interests of the
public with that of the elite. For instance, the SCI permitted the
establishment of a financial district at the cost of small farmers who
depended on the land for a livelihood. 105 Similarly, alongside
constructing an expressway, farmland was acquired along the proposed
route for commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and
residential purposes. 106 In a similar vein, the judiciary has also

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Sayyed Ratanbhai Sayeed v. Shirdi Nagar Panchayaat, (2016) 4 SCC 631 (India).
101. Id.
102. Scindia Employees Union v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1 SCC 85 (India).
103. Abdul Husein Tayabali v. State of Gujarat, (1968) 1 SCR 597 (India).
104. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 (India).
105. Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector, (2008) 9 S.C.C. 552.
106. Id.
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permitted the acquisition of land for constructing tourist complexes,107
and even a hotel-cum-golf resort. 108
While of course the LAA 1894 is now replaced by the LARR
2013, it does not significantly alter the power structure put in place by
the former. In other words, while the LARR 2013 is a step forward, in
that it requires enhanced compensation and efforts at rehabilitating the
landowners, it does little to alter the current discourse on “public
purpose.” Firstly, it again permits the government to acquire land for a
private company, and without any of the restrictions from the LAA
1894 on the manner in which the land may be utilized. Secondly, it
defines “public purpose” in broad terms to include, for instance,
infrastructure projects, industrial corridors, mining activities, and
tourism projects, which leaves little scope for the judiciary to import
the “public use” test that was employed by the SCI in R.L. Arora v.
State of Uttar Pradesh. 109 It is likely therefore to continue to “permit
the transfer of resources to the private sector,” except with “some
solace for the displaced.” 110
One significant gain found in LARR 2013, though, is the
requirement of prior consent of eighty percent of affected families to
proceed with the land acquisition. 111 The process of acquisition for a
company therefore at least bears some resemblance now to an ordinary
market transaction insomuch as it depends on consent, although not of
all those affected. Still, worryingly, there have already been some
efforts by the present government to dilute this requirement.
What we are left with, then, is a position whereby acquisitions of
property in India are at least ostensibly treated as though necessary for
meeting the justice requirements/costs of the state. Whether such needs
are truly being met, however, is another matter. Instead, through
judicial interpretation, while private property may readily be acquired
by the state for what is treated as a public purpose, the actual benefit to
the community in terms of justice needs may be slight, with a
corresponding diminution of the protection provided for private
107. State of Haryana v. Eros City Developers Private Limited; Sooraram Pratap Reddy
v. District Collector, (2008) 9 SCC 552.
108. Royal Orchid Hotels v. G. Jayaram Reddy, (2011) 10 S.C.C. 608.
109. 1962 Supp (2) S.C.R. 149.
110. Mihir Desai, Land Acquisition Law and the Proposed Challenges, 46(26–27) ECON.
& POL. WKLY. 95, 95–100 (2011).
111. Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1984
(India), § 2(2)(b)(i).
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property. We will see a similar outcome in Australia, both of which can
be contrasted as with the strong protection of private property in the
United States.
III. AUSTRALIA: SECTION 51(XXXI)
As is the case with India, and as we will see when we turn to the
United States, the place of property, and especially of land, is deeply
ingrained in the Australian psyche. Whereas the depth of feeling about
property in India is found in judicial interpretation and is exemplified
in the United States in the factual story of Mrs. Kelo’s Little Pink
House in Kelo v. City of New London, 112 the Australian sentiment can
be traced to a fictional account found in The Castle, a comedy film
which follows the battle of Daryl Kerrigan in the High Court of
Australia (the equivalent of the Supreme Court of the United States) to
prevent his house from being compulsorily acquired for use as an
airport. 113 Before the High Court, Kerrigan summarizes the successful
argument against acquisition:
I’m really starting to understand how the Aborigines feel . . . . This
house is like their land. It holds their memories. The land is their
story. It’s everything. You can’t just pick it up and plonk it down
somewhere else. This country’s gotta stop stealing other people’s
land. 114

Sometimes fact imitates fiction: The Federal Court decision in French
v. Gray, 115 for instance, involved a challenge to an attempt by the
Australian Commonwealth (federal) government compulsorily to
acquire Graham French’s farm in South Australia for military
purposes. 116 A real-life Daryl Kerrigan, French won the case, but
“lamented the time and money lost in the long process,” concluding
that the government “shouldn’t be able to rip people’s lands off them
for no good reason . . . it’s just wrong.” 117
112. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
113. THE CASTLE (Village Roadshow 1997).
114. Dave Crewe, The Castle: Cheat Sheet, S.B.S. AUSTRALIA (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.sbs.com.au/movies/article/2017/04/10/castle-cheat-sheet [https://perma.cc/P4RTHRGA].
115. French v Gray [2013] F.C.A. 263 (27 March 2013) (Austl.).
116. Id.
117. Tory Shepherd, Their home is their castle - Corunna Station will stay in the hands of
the French family after Federal Court victory, ADELAIDE NOW (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/south-australia/their-home-is-their-castle-corunna-
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Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution provides a means
for the Commonwealth to acquire private property to meet justice costs
as well as a protection for private property interests such as those
claimed by the fictional Daryl Kerrigan and the factual Graham
French. 118 The provision reads:
51 Legislative powers of the Parliament . . .
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to:
...
(xxxi) the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has
power to make laws; 119

The heading and opening clause of Section 51 are important, for
two reasons. First, in its terms, the Australian Constitution applies only
to the Commonwealth, or federal government, and not to the States or
Territories 120 which comprise the Australian federation. While the
States are subject to their own legislatively imposed limitations upon
the power compulsorily to acquire property, 121 we are concerned here
only with comparing the constitutions of the United States, India, and
Australia. Unlike India, where legislation plays a significant role in
station-will-stay-in-the-hands-of-the-french-family-after-federal-court-victory/story-fni6uo1m1226756092281 [https://perma.cc/XKE6-2ZJX].
118. See generally Simon Evans, When is an acquisition of property not an acquisition of
property?: The search for a principled approach to section 51(xxxi), 11 PUBLIC L REV. 183
(2000).
119. Australia Constitution s 51.
120. The Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory are territories of the
Commonwealth of Australia, with the relationship between the Commonwealth and a Territory
governed by the Constitution of Australia, s 122. The Commonwealth has exercised its power
to establish self-government in both Territories by enacting the Northern Territory (SelfGovernment) Act 1978 (Cth) (Austl.) and the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government)
Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl.), respectively.
121. See, e.g., Desane Properties Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2018] NSW 553 (1
May 2018) (interpreting the relevant New South Wales legislation, the Land Acquisition (Just
Terms) Compensation Act 1991 (NSW)). For representative examples of the Commonwealth,
Territory, and State legislation, see Land Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth); Lands Acquisition Act
(NT); Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic); Michael Crommelin, Land Title,
Acquisition and Management in Australia [2011] U. OF MELBOURNE LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER
NO. 587, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060700
[https://perma.cc/3GLV-H8AX]; GARY NEWTON & CHRISTOPHER CONOLLY, LAND
ACQUISITION (7th ed. 2017); MARCUS JACOBS, LAW OF COMPULSORY LAND ACQUISITION (2d
ed. 2015).
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determining when compulsory acquisition of land is justified, in
Australia, legislation enacted by the Commonwealth—the Land
Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth)—merely establishes the process, and not
the justifiability of such acquisitions. The Commonwealth legislation
itself is subject to the terms of Section 51(xxxi), which establishes the
standard for testing the justifiability of compulsory acquisition of land.
And, second, because, taken together—and unlike the Fifth
Amendment to the US Constitution, which is framed only as a
limitation on power 122—the heading and opening clause of Section 51
make clear that Sub-Section xxxi effects both a grant of power and a
limitation upon it.
There is little available evidence which reveals what precisely the
framers had in mind when they included Section 51(xxxi) in the
Constitution. Sir John Quick (one of the framers of the Australian
Constitution) and Sir Robert Garran (the secretary of the framers
drafting committee)—who published an annotated edition of the
Australian Constitution contemporaneously with its promulgation in
1901 which remains the authoritative account of the conventions and
debates which ultimately produced the Australian Constitution123—
provide little historical background. 124 Few authors since have shed
any light on these origins, although in JT International SA v.
Commonwealth, Justice (now Chief Justice) Kiefel supports the view
that while “[t]here appears to have been little discussion of this
provision in the Convention Debates[,] . . . [i]t was drafted to meet the
concern that there might have been some uncertainty as to whether the
Commonwealth had legislative power to acquire property.” 125
Quick and Garran provide historical support for Justice Kiefel’s
view, focusing their attention on the fact that the Australian and
American constitutional provisions are not the same; rather, the words
“the acquisition of property” “expressly confer[] on the
122. See generally GEORGE WILLIAMS, SEAN BRENNAN AND ANDREW LYNCH,
BLACKSHIELD AND WILLIAMS AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2018).
123. See generally SIR JOHN QUICK AND SIR ROBERT GARRAN, THE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH (1955).
124. Indeed, it is likely the case that Quick and Garran provide little by way of historical
background because there simply is no extant contemporaneous account of the debates which
produced Section 51(xxxi). See Simon Evans, Property and the Drafting of the Australian
Constitution, 29(2) FED. L. REV. 121 (2001). But see R. L. Hamilton, Some Aspects of the
Acquisition Power of the Commonwealth, 5 FED. L. REV. 265 (1973).
125. J.T. International SA v Commonwealth [2012] 250 CLR 1, 112–13 (Austl.).
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Commonwealth, through the Federal Parliament, the right—technically
called the right of ‘eminent domain’—to compulsorily take property,
both private and provincial, for Federal purposes.” This, Quick and
Garran argue, is the functional equivalent not of the US Fifth
Amendment, but of the Necessary and Proper Clause contained in
Article I which, they note, vests in the federal government the right of
eminent domain, which “may be exercised within the States, when
necessary, for the enjoyment and exercise of the powers conferred upon
the Government by the Constitution.” 126 And while the Australian
Constitution contains a “ways and means” power in Section 51(xxxix),
it was not considered advisable by the drafters to use it to allow the
right of eminent domain to be exercised upon any implied or incidental
power. 127 The operation of Section 51(xxxi) therefore hinges upon the
question of sovereignty:
Although the American courts [as of 1901] have given . . .
decisions [concerning the necessary and proper clause and the
takings power] it must be remembered that they were given under
the Constitution of a sovereign State. The Commonwealth is not a
sovereign State, but a federated community possessing many
political powers approaching, and elements resembling,
sovereignty, but falling short of it. Its Parliament can only exercise
delegated powers carved out for it, and assigned to it, by the
sovereign Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland. No implied
power will be founded on any conception of latent unexpressed
sovereignty, as in the case of the Government of the United States.
Hence all possible doubt as to the right of the Commonwealth to
acquire property for federal purposes has been removed by this
sub-section [s 51(xxxi)], which renders it unnecessary to resort to
the “ways and means” sub-sec. xxxix. 128

On its terms, then, Section 51(xxxi) comprises both an express
grant of Commonwealth legislative power to acquire property and a
limitation upon that power. The leading High Court treatment of the
provision, Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth confirms this
textual understanding. 129 Having started from the textual understanding
126. QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 640-41.
127. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 640-41; see also Rosalind Dixon,
Overriding Guarantee of Just Terms of Supplementary Source of Power? Rethinking s 51 of the
Constitution, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 638 (2005).
128. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 641.
129. Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth [1948] 76 CLR 1, 349, aff’d JT
International SA v Commonwealth [2012] 250 CLR 1, 113 [313] (Austl.).
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of a grant of power and a limitation, the High Court has, through
interpretation and application, defined the scope of operation of both
components.
In order to set the parameters of the grant of power compulsorily
to take property, the High Court focusses on the meaning of
“acquisition” and of “property.” In relation to the former, the Court
applies a “deprivation-corresponding benefit test,” which requires not
only that a party—either a person, a State, or a Territory 130 (although
not a private third party 131)—must lose property rights—but also that
another party—which may or may not be the Commonwealth, provided
that such party, including a State or a Territory, 132 is acting pursuant to
an exercise of Commonwealth legislative power—must acquire a
corresponding benefit. 133 As such, the mere deprivation of property134
or the adjustment of an entitlement to a resource pursuant to a license135
is insufficient to constitute an acquisition for the purposes of this
power, although the egregiousness of the loss may sometimes influence
the courts as to whether such a loss and corresponding benefit is
found. 136
But in applying the deprivation-corresponding benefit test, the
High Court has made clear that a “regulatory taking” fails to constitute
an acquisition. 137 Cunningham v. The Commonwealth, involved a
challenge brought by several former members of the Commonwealth
Parliament against legislation which altered retirement allowances and
130. See generally State of South Australia v Honourable Peter Slipper M.P. (‘Nuclear
Waste Dump Case’) [2004] 136 FCR 164 (Austl.); see also generally A.J. Brown, When Does
Property Become Territory? Nuclear Waste, Federal Land Acquisition and Constitutional
Requirements for State Consent, 28 ADELAIDE L. REV. 113 (2007); see generally Dennis Rose,
The 10-Point Plan – Its Constitutional Validity, 17(3) AUST. MINING & PETROLEUM L. J. 216
(1998).
131. See generally Tom Allen, The Acquisition of Property on Just Terms, 22 SYDNEY L.
REV. 351 (2000).
132. See Sean Brennan, Section 51(xxxi) and the Acquisition of Property under
Commonwealth-State Arrangements: The Relevance to Native Title Extinguishment on Just
Terms, 15(2) AUST. INDIGENOUS L. REV. 74 (2011).
133. See Duane Ostler, Gain as loss: The High Court’s approach in regulatory acquisition
cases 26(1) BOND L. REV. 66 (2014); Duane Ostler, The Drafting of the Australian
Commonwealth Acquisition Clause 28(2) U. OF TASMANIA L. REV. 211 (2009); Duane Ostler,
A Case of Non-Identical Twins – Comparing the Evolution of Acquisition Law in Australia and
the United States, 10(1) CANBERRA L. REV. 66 (2011).
134. P.J. Magennis Pty. Ltd v Commonwealth [1949] 80 CLR 382 (Austl.).
135. I.C.M. Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] 240 CLR 140 (Austl.).
136. See generally Ostler, supra note 133.
137. See generally Pamela O’Connor, The Changing Paradigm of Property and the
Framing of Regulation as a “Taking,” 36(2) MONASH U. L. REV. 50 (2010).
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travel benefits, arguing that because such rights constituted property,
any variation fell within the prohibition of Section 51(xxxi). 138 The
High Court held these benefits to be statutorily created property
interests “inherently subject to variation” or “inherently defeasible”—
by which was meant that such rights were susceptible to later
modification or extinguishment without compensation—and therefore
not capable of animating the protection of Section 51(xxxi). 139
So as to establish the scope of what might be acquired by the
Commonwealth, the High Court has developed a broad definition of
“property.” 140 Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel establishes that
“‘property’ in s 51(xxxi) is a general term which refers to any tangible
or intangible thing which the law protects under the name of property.
The acquisition of the possession of land is an instance of the
acquisition of property.” 141 And recent judicial authority suggests that
this definition of property may include a “spiritual connection” to land
as part of native title held by Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples. 142
Having set the parameters of the power to acquire, the High Court
has focused on the words “on just terms” and “purpose in respect of
which” to set the limits to Commonwealth legislative activity taken in
furtherance of it. Purely as a matter of textual analysis, these two sets
138. Cunningham v The Commonwealth [2016] 259 CLR 536 (Austl.).
139. Cunningham v The Commonwealth [2016] 259 CLR 536 (Austl.). The High Court
applies the same approach to statutorily created mining and water licenses. Newcrest Mining
(WA) Ltd v Commonwealth [1997] 190 CLR 513 (Austl.); Commonwealth . WMC Resources
Ltd [1998] 194 CLR 1 (Austl.); Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Limited v
Commonwealth [2012] 246 CLR 561 (Austl.); see also Margaret Brock, When is property
inherently defeasible for the purposes of s 51(xxxi)?, 21(2) AUST. PROP. L. J. 180 (2012); Gavan
Griffith & Geoffrey Kennett, Constitutional Protection Against Uncompensated Expropriations
of Property, in AUSTRALIAN MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 49
(1998); D.F. Jackson & Stephen Lloyd, Compulsory Acquisition of Property, in AUSTRALIAN
MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 75 [1998].
140. See generally Pamela O’Connor, The Changing Paradigm of Property and the
Framing of Regulation as a “Taking,” 36(2) MONASH U. L. REV. 50 (2010).
141. Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel [1944] 68 C.L.R. 261, 295 (Austl.).
142. See Northern Territory v Griffiths [2019] HCA 7 (Austl.); see also Griffiths v
Minister for Lands, Planning and Environment [2008] 235 CLR 232, 253-57 (Austl.);
Queensland v Congoo [2015] 256 CLR 239 (Austl.); D.F. Jackson & Stephen Lloyd,
Compulsory Acquisition of Property, in AUSTRALIAN MINING AND PETROLEUM LAW
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 75 (1998); Robert French & Patricia Lane, The common law of native
title in Australia, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL SCHOLARSHIP 10 (2002); Sean Brennan, Native Title
and the Acquisition of Property under the Australian Constitution, 28 MELBOURNE U. L. REV.
28 (2004); Wing Hsieh, Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution and the Compulsory
Acquisition of Native Title, 32 ADELAIDE L. REV. 287 (2011); Brennan, supra note 132.
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of words, read together, might be assumed to establish an individual
right to private property. The Privy Council 143 (while that body
remained the final court of appeal for Australia) seemed to adopt an
individual right view, and Quick and Garran wrote:
It was declared that private property should not be taken for public
use without just compensation. This is regarded not as a grant but
a restriction on the implied power. So the power of the Federal
Parliament to take property . . . is limited by the condition that it
must be exercised “on just terms.” This condition is consistent
with the common law of England and with the general law of
European nations. It is intended to recognize the principle of the
immunity of . . . property from interference by the Federal
authority, except on fair and equitable terms, and this principle is
thus constitutionally established and placed beyond legislative
control. 144

And “purpose in respect of which” establish “[t]he second limit to
the power of the Commonwealth to acquire . . . property . . . , that it
must only take if for purposes in respect of which the Parliament has
power to make laws.” 145 By this, Quick and Garran meant those powers
expressly conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament by Section
51, implying that these words are something in the nature of an
individual right to private property. The High Court of Australia,
however, consistently suggests that both sets of words comprise a limit
on Commonwealth legislative power and not the creation or protection
of an individual right to private property. 146
Notwithstanding the High Court’s approach, though, in its
invocation, Section 51(xxxi) appears to protect an individual right to
private property. In fact, the High Court itself seems to view the
relationship between the power conferred and the limitation imposed
as balancing community and individual interests. 147 Justice Kiefel, for
instance, wrote in JT International SA v. Commonwealth that “ . . . s
143. See James v Commonwealth [1936] 55 CLR 1, 43–44 (Austl.).
144. QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 641.
145. See QUICK & GARRAN, supra note 123, at 642.
146. See N. K. F. O’Neill, Constitutional Human Rights in Australia, 17(2) FED. L. REV.
85 (1987); Matthew Stubbs, The Eminent Domain in Australia: The ‘Individual Rights’
Approach to s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution (2001) (PhD Thesis, The University of
Adelaide); Paulina Fishman, Section 51(xxxi): A constitutional guarantee to disappoint property
owners, 6 PROP. L. REV. 27 (2016).
147. See Tom Allen, The Acquisition of Property on Just Terms, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 351
(2000).
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51(xxxi) . . . serve[s] a dual purpose: to provide the Commonwealth
with that power and to provide the individual or the State affected with
protection against governmental interferences with their proprietary
rights without proper recompense.” 148 As such, the words “on just
terms” tend to be treated as an individual guarantee of private property,
while the words “purpose in respect of which” as the action which
triggers or enlivens the operation of that guarantee.
In Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth, the Court considered
the nature of the just terms guarantee, holding that the arrangements for
acquisition of property must either be “fair” or at least such that a
legislature could reasonably consider the arrangements as being “fair.”
Fairness in this context must account for the interests of all parties
affected by the acquisition, as opposed only to the interests of the
holder of the property so acquired, 149 and compensation can take nonmonetary forms, 150 although it need not be restricted to the value of the
property acquired at the date it was taken. 151
At a minimum, the action which triggers or enlivens the just terms
guarantee includes any of the legislative powers which the
Commonwealth Parliament possesses pursuant to Section 51. 152 In
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth, Mason CJ wrote that
the relevant words “confine the exercise of the power to an
implementation of a purpose within the field of Commonwealth
legislative power. They are not to be read as an exclusive and
exhaustive statement of the Parliament’s powers to deal with or provide
for the involuntary disposition of or transfer of title to an interest in
property.” 153 As such, the just terms guarantee must be read into other
legislative powers which, by their exercise, purport to acquire
property. 154

148. J.T. International SA v Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1, 112-3 [313] (Kiefel J.)
(Austl.).
149. Nelungaloo Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1947] 75 CLR 495 (Austl.).
150. Wurridjal v Commonwealth [2009] 237 CLR 309 (Austl.); see also Celia Winnett,
Just Terms or Just Money? Section 51(xxxi), Native Title and Non-Monetary Terms of
Acquisition, 33 U. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 776 (2010).
151. Grace Bros Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1946] 72 CLR 269 (Austl.).
152. Johnston Fear & Kingham & The Offset Printing Company Pty Ltd v Commonwealth
[1943] 67 CLR 314, 318 (Austl.); see also Trade Practices Commission (Cth) v Tooth & Co Ltd
[1979] 142 CLR 397, 403 (Austl.).
153. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] 179 CLR 155, 169 (Austl.).
154. Id. at 169.
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It is necessary, then, to determine whether the exercise of
Commonwealth power triggers or enlivens the just terms guarantee.
Some powers exclude the guarantee because “[a]lthough s. 51(xxxi)
abstracts the power of acquisition from other legislative powers in s.
51, it cannot be interpreted so broadly as to render meaningless the
legitimate use and operation of other powers conferred by s. 51.”155
Two types of such exclusion exist. First, some powers found in Section
51, by their express terms, do not require compliance with the
guarantee; the acquisition of state railways and bankruptcy being the
axiomatic examples. 156 Second, the grant of another legislative power
found in Section 51 may imply, by its terms, incongruity or
inconsistency with the just terms guarantee; 157 while taxation 158 and
criminal and civil penalties and exactions represent the paradigmatic
cases, 159 many other instances exist, including war-time requisitions,160
acquisition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional lands,161
and the imposition of a pecuniary penalty by way of civil proceedings
and the acquisition by the Controller of Enemy Property of the property
of subjects of a former enemy to be applied to reparations payable by
an enemy State. 162
Provided that the power so exercised does not fall within one of
the categories which excludes the operation of just terms, it is necessary
to determine that it is, in fact, an exercise of power which triggers or
enlivens the guarantee. This presents more difficulty than one might
expect. Again, the High Court proceeds by considering those laws
which fail to enliven the guarantee. In Clunies-Ross v. Commonwealth,
the High Court declined to decide whether Section 51(xxxi) was
“confined to the making of laws with respect to acquisition of property
for some purpose related to a need for or proposed use or application
155. Id. at 219.
156. Id. at 170.
157. See R v Smithers, Ex parte McMillan [1982] 152 CLR 477, 487 (Austl.); Re Director
of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler [1994] 179 CLR 270, 285 (Austl.); Theophanous v.
Commonwealth [2006] 225 CLR 101 (Austl.).
158. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1994) 179 CLR 155, 170–71
(Austl.).
159. R v Smithers, Ex parte McMillan [1982] 152 CLR 477, 487 (Austl.); see also Re
Director of Public Prosecutions; Ex parte Lawler (1994) 179 CLR 270, 278–81 (Brennan J.),
285 (Deane and Gaudron JJ.), 295 (McHugh J.).
160. See, e.g., Andrews v. Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255; Minister of State for the Army v.
Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261.
161. See, e.g., Commonwealth v New South Wales (1923) 33 CLR 1 (Austl.).
162. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] 179 CLR 155, 187-88 (Austl.).
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of the property to be acquired . . . .” 163 Still, three approaches may be
discerned. The first, in ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth164
and Spencer v. Commonwealth, 165 seeks to characterize a law so as to
determine whether it does or does not fall within a power triggering the
guarantee. 166 Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth167
represents a second approach; there, Justices Deane and Gaudron,
while suggesting that a precise test could not be applied so as to
determine whether a law falls within the scope of Section 51(xxxi), it
was possible to identify several laws that would not bear the character
of a law with respect to the acquisition of property:
One such category consists of laws which provide for the creation,
modification, extinguishment or transfer of rights and liabilities as
an incident of, or a means for enforcing, some general regulation
of the conduct, rights and obligations of citizens in relationships
or areas which need to be regulated in the common interest.
Another category consists of laws defining and altering rights and
liabilities under a government scheme involving the expenditure
of government funds to provide social security benefits or for other
public purposes. 168

This “categorisation” approach means that while some laws may
have the acquisition of property as an incidental consequence, that
acquisition is not sufficient to impart upon the law the character of a
law with respect to Section 51(xxxi), thus enlivening the just terms
guarantee.
A third approach, not yet adopted by a plurality of the High Court,
involves the requirement that the Commonwealth power be exercised
for a public purpose. Griffiths v. Minister for Lands involved an
exercise of power pursuant to the Crown Lands Act (NT) 169 which, it
was argued, enlivened the operation of Section 43 of the Lands
Acquisition Act (NT), permitting the Minister to acquire land “for any
purpose whatsoever” (language very similar to Section 51(xxxi) but
applicable to the Northern Territory 170). The appellants argued that
163. Clunies-Ross v Commonwealth [1984] 155 CLR 193, 200 (Austl.).
164. ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2009] 240 CLR 140 (Austl.).
165. Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] 241 CLR 118 (Austl.).
166. See generally Stephen Lloyd, Compulsory Acquisition and Informal Agreements:
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 137 (2011).
167. Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1994] 179 CLR 155 (Austl.).
168. Id. at 189-90.
169. NT is the abbreviation for Northern Territory.
170. For more on the territories, see supra note 120.
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notwithstanding the use of “for any purpose whatsoever,” the Minister
was not empowered to acquire land from one person solely to enable it
to be sold or leased by the Northern Territory for the private use of
another person. 171 While the majority resolved the issue in favour of
the Northern Territory as a matter of statutory interpretation in
accordance with Section 51(xxxi) jurisprudence, 172 Justice Kirby, in
dissent, wrote that “[t]he public purpose of all compulsory acquisitions
under federal or Territory law has a constitutional origin.” 173 Justice
Kirby concluded that a compulsory acquisition for private purposes
may therefore fall outside the public purposes requirement implicit in
Section 51(xxxi). 174 While writing in a dissent not then or since adopted
by a majority of the High Court, Justice Kirby claims to be
summarizing both the implication of Section 51(xxxi), and the relevant
jurisprudence of the High Court as to those instances which will enliven
the just terms guarantee. As such, a “public purpose” requirement for a
compulsory acquisition may represent a third approach to the operation
of the just terms guarantee.
Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution is both a grant of
power so as to allow the Commonwealth to meet its justice needs/costs,
and a limitation upon that grant so as to provide at least some minimal
level of protection for private property which may be so acquired. It is
rare, though, for the Commonwealth to rely solely upon that grant so
as to effect a compulsory acquisition; rather, the Commonwealth
typically relies upon some other power found in Section 51. A
compulsory acquisition having occurred, the courts, in an effort to
balance the interests of the community with those of the individual,
consider the purpose (pursuant to a relevant head of Commonwealth
legislative power) in respect of which the property is acquired so as to
determine whether the just terms guarantee (which provides, at least
impliedly, an individual right to private property) has been enlivened.
And given the fact that the power relied upon by the Commonwealth
for such acquisition is seldom that found in Section 51(xxxi), but much
more frequently a power that is for one reason or another excluded from
the operation of the just terms guarantee, it is equally unusual for the
High Court to find that the guarantee is enlivened. Thus, as occurs in
171.
(Austl.).
172.
173.
174.

Griffiths v Minister for Lands, Planning and Environment [2008] 235 CLR 232, ¶ 19
Id. at ¶ 30.
Id. at ¶ 84.
Id. at ¶ 86.
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India, whether such acquisition is truly for the purpose of meeting the
justice requirements/costs of the Commonwealth, it is treated as such,
at least ostensibly, by the High Court.
IV. UNITED STATES: THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Any discussion of compulsory acquisition of property in the
United States must begin with the relevant clauses of the Fifth
Amendment to the US Constitution: “No person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.” 175 These
two clauses are commonly referred to, respectively, as the Due Process
Clause and the Takings Clause. Although often treated separately, the
two clauses are obviously closely related and are not always rigorously
distinguished from one another. 176 The Due Process Clause forbids the
government from depriving any person of property “without due
process of law”; or, stated positively, allows government infringement
of property rights only if consistent with the requirements of due
process. The Takings Clause forbids the government from taking
private property for public use without just compensation; or, stated
positively, allows compulsory acquisition of private property but only
for “public use” and with “just compensation.”
Almost all state constitutions contain provisions similar to the
Takings Clause.177 At one time, these state constitutional protections
were more significant because the Fifth Amendment in the federal Bill
of Rights was long held to apply only to actions of the federal

175. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
176. One scholar, who seemingly reviewed all the prior due process cases, reported that
the US Supreme Court did not always limit the word “taking” to cases arising under the Takings
Clause and “deprivation” to cases under the Due Process Clause. See FRANK R. STRONG,
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 202 n. 414
(1986).
177. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.”). North Carolina is today the last state without a Takings Clause in
its constitution. See PHILIP NICHOLS, 1 THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.8 (Julius L. Sackman
& Russell D. Van Brunt eds., 3d ed. 2000). Notwithstanding the absence of a Takings Clause,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that compulsory acquisition without compensation
is unconstitutional as a violation of “natural equity.” See Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550
(1874). Today, the source of the restraint is located in the clause guaranteeing the protections of
the “law of the land.” N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (“No person shall . . . be in any manner deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”). See Finch v. Durham, 384 S.E.2d 8
(N.C. 1989).
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government. 178 Then in 1897 in Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad Co. v. Chicago 179 the US Supreme Court ruled that
compensation for private property taken for public use was a
requirement of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
adopted in 1868, which applies to actions by the states. 180 Today the
case is commonly described as “incorporating” the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, and is viewed
as the first in a series of cases that over the next half century applied
most of the guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although state constitutional provisions are today largely
overshadowed by the federal clauses, much of the basic law of eminent
domain was originally made by state courts. From early in American
history, states had delegated the sovereign power of eminent domain to
private companies engaged in providing useful improvements, such as
canals. But it was with the advent of the railroad that delegation of the
state’s power of compulsory acquisition became widespread. 181 At
first, the delegation was in private acts of incorporation of individual
railroads. 182 Later, general railroad laws granted all carriers the power
of eminent domain, 183 greatly accelerating the development of the law
upon the subject. As the leading legal historian of American railroads
has written: “Railroads provided much of the impetus for judges to
fashion takings jurisprudence.” 184 In the rush to secure the benefits of
the new means of transportation, the exact nature of the interest taken—

178. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (“We are of opinion, that the
provision in the fifth amendment to the constitution, declaring that private property shall not be
taken for public use, without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise
of power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the
states.”).
179. 166 U.S. 266 (1897).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.”).
181. The companies usually tried to acquire the needed property by voluntary sale, but
bargaining was always in the shadow of compulsory acquisition.
182. See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, N.C.
Priv. L., ch. 78, arts. 14, 18 (1833).
183. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Railroad Companies, no. 82,
Laws of Michigan, 1855.
184. JAMES W. ELY, RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 189 (2001).
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easement or fee simple 185—was sometimes uncertain, a problem that
continues to cloud property titles to this day. 186
The prime motivation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the analogous state constitutional provisions was the
protection of private property, viewed as “the guardian of every other
right” 187 and as a contributing cause of prosperity. 188 The constitutions
guaranteed “just compensation,” generally the fair market value of
what was taken, the amount to be determined by a court, often aided by
a jury, not by the legislature. 189 Much of the basic law concerning just
compensation was laid down by state courts during the Railroad Era.190
Where the rail line bisected a larger parcel, additional compensation
for severance damages might be claimed.191 Whether and to what
extent to allow the railroads credit for benefits conferred by access to
an improved means of transportation proved particularly challenging.
At first, railroads often received offsets for benefits to the general
service area, but over the course of the nineteenth century the rule
emerged that only special benefits to the affected landowner could be
considered in the calculation. 192 The complex economics involved in
valuing what was taken continue to raise challenging questions to this
day.
By far the most momentous development of takings jurisprudence
concerned the public use requirement. As noted above, the Fifth
Amendment does not refer to compulsory acquisition for a “public
purpose,” but rather to compulsory acquisition for a “public use.” It
was early determined that public use is not synonymous with public
185. Id. at 197–98. To complicate matters further, it is possible that only a determinable
interest, “so long as used for railroad purposes,” whether of easement or fee, was taken. Id.
186. Compare King Assocs. L.L.P. v. Bechtler Development Co., 632 S.E.2d 243 (N.C.
2006) (finding that deed conveyed a fee simple) with Brown v. Penn Cent’l Corp., 510 N.E.2d
641 (Ind. 1987) (finding that deed created an easement).
187. ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF
GREAT BRITAIN, IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775); see also Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017) (“Property rights are necessary to preserve freedom,
for property ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world
where governments are always eager to do so for them.”).
188. See generally James Ely, “That Due Satisfaction Be Made:” The Fifth Amendment
and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1992).
189. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (holding that the
condemnee is entitled to be placed “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not
been taken.”).
190. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
191. See generally id.
192. ELY, supra note 184, at 193.
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ownership. Use by the public, as shippers or passengers, was held to be
adequate. 193 As Thomas Cooley, the leading constitutional scholar of
the day, recognized, the judicial response to the railroad cases led to a
general weakening of restraints upon the exercise of eminent
domain. 194 Over time, the use-by-the-public test proved difficult to
administer: How many people had to have access to the property that
was taken? And at what price? In addition, the changing role of
government in economic development made the test increasingly
impractical. In consequence, the requirement of public use was
replaced in judicial interpretation by the more relaxed requirement of
public purpose. What that meant was addressed in Berman v. Parker,195
decided in 1954, in which the US Supreme Court held that the
requirement was satisfied by any government purpose permitted by the
police power, the general authorization to act on behalf of public health,
safety, and welfare. 196 It may be said today that it is the purpose of the
taking, not the use of what was taken that is important.
The most difficult question concerning “public purpose” was
whether it would be satisfied if a government took private property and
transferred it to another private party. “Taking the property of A and
giving it to B” had long been the paradigm case of a violation of due
process. 197 But in 2005, in Kelo v. City of New London, 198 a sharply
divided US Supreme Court upheld such a taking as part of a
comprehensive redevelopment plan. 199 The case arose in the fraught
context of depriving sympathetic homeowners of their property for the
purpose of turning it over to a corporation that promised to bring jobs
and benefits to the community. 200 Although the majority of justices
approved the taking, they were careful to point out that they were
deciding only the minimum requirements of the Fifth Amendment and
that the states were free to impose stricter standards. 201
Although the Court’s decision in Kelo was consistent with
precedent and respectful of state and local decision making, it was
193. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
194. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 36 (1880).
195. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
196. Id.
197. See JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 33–50 (2003).
198. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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greeted with widespread criticism. Many states promptly accepted the
Court’s invitation by adopting statutes and even constitutional
amendments to limit compulsory acquisition. 202 Defenders of property
rights continue to protest the decision to this day, producing a popular
book about one of the properties condemned, The Little Pink House, in
2009, 203 followed in 2018 by a feature-length film of the same name.204
While the taking in Kelo followed the usual procedure of an action
brought by the condemning authority against named property owners,
it sometimes happens that property owners themselves commence an
action, claiming that the government has already taken their property
or an interest in it. Because of the reversal of the usual parties, this is
commonly referred to as “inverse condemnation.” 205 In United States
v. Causby, 206 a leading case from 1946 concerning air rights, property
owners prevailed in an action to recover damages from the United
States for the value of an easement taken by the military’s regular lowaltitude flights over their property. 207
Although Causby involved the taking of an easement, a familiar
property right, inverse condemnation has also been successfully
invoked in a case brought by Native Americans claiming a taking of
their ancestors’ right to pass property by devise or inheritance.208
Because state courts sometimes reject claims of inverse condemnation
by holding that the property right in question never existed or was
previously extinguished, 209 the suggestion has been made that there
may be such a thing as a “judicial taking.” 210

202. See Donald E. Sanders et al., The Aftermath of Kelo, 34 REAL ESTATE L. J. 157
(2006).
203. JEFF BENEDICT, THE LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND
COURAGE (2009).
204. THE LITTLE PINK HOUSE (Brightlight Pictures 2018).
205. Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective of
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005).
206. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
207. The easement in Causby is now commonly referred to as an avigational easement.
208. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
209. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969) (finding that the
public had acquired an easement over ocean beaches by custom).
210. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (Scalia, J., dissenting from
the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari) (involving title to the same real property that was
involved in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay). Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626
(2001) (“States do not have the unfettered authority to ‘shape and define property rights and
reasonable investment-backed expectations,’ leaving landowners without recourse against
unreasonable regulations.”).
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While inverse condemnation describes cases of actual taking, it is
also possible for government action to reduce the market value of
private property by regulations restricting use. Although commonly
referred to as “regulatory takings,” these cases do not involve
government acquisition of title to the affected property. 211 More
properly understood as a deprivation of an interest in property protected
by the Due Process Clause, regulatory takings demonstrate the extent
to which the two clauses—Due Process and Takings—continue to
influence one another.
In one of the earliest cases to recognize a regulatory taking,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 212 decided in 1922, the US Supreme
Court struck down a statute that prohibited a mining company from
removing coal that might cause a subsidence, damaging structures on
the surface. Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
extended the traditional definition of “taking” by declaring that when
the diminution of a property’s value “reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act.” 213 In short, he stated, “If
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 214 But only a
few years later, in the 1926 case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 215 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted use and
thereby lowered property values, making clear that regulations that
diminish value to a lesser extent do not constitute a taking. 216
For the last century, the justices have struggled to determine when
regulations go “too far.” At times, the Court has seemed inclined to
favor “community rights” over individual ownership. In the leading
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 217 decided in
1978, it upheld a municipal regulation that prohibited a landowner from
modifying a building deemed historic, emphasizing the building’s
esthetic value to the public and denying that the owner had any
“investment-backed expectations” of being permitted to change the use

211.
(2015).
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 601
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Id.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S 104 (1978).
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of the property. 218 More often than not, regulations are upheld unless
they are so restrictive that they render the property essentially
valueless. 219
Worries persisted that the rights of individual property owners
were being sacrificed, and in 1982, the Court held that a regulation that
required a “permanent physical occupation of property,” even of only
a very small portion, for the benefit of other persons, was a prohibited
taking. 220 In a later case, the Court raised the prospect of damage
awards for excessive regulation by holding that a property owner may
be entitled to compensation for the temporary loss of use when
restrictions on the use of property were later held to be invalid.221
Expressive of the new judicial solicitude for the rights of property
owners were decisions that invalidated certain conditions imposed on
the grant of building permits. 222 Today, the test is often whether the
regulation appears to force “some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.” 223
V. CONCLUSION: COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS
What we have found is that the final appellate courts in all three
jurisdictions have played and play a paramount role in balancing the
interests of the community in the form of justice needs/costs and the
individual right to private property However, while the Indian and
Australian courts seem to favor the interests of the state/community
over those of the individual—albeit for very different reasons—the US
Supreme Court tends to side much more frequently with the holder of
private property. As such, the individual right seems to have a priority
218. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 123-28; see also Murr, 137 S.Ct. at 1943;
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.
219. See Murr, 137 S.Ct. at 1942; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617; Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
220. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
221. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
222. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that a state
agency’s grant of a building permit conditioned on the landowner’s dedication of an easement
to the public was a taking that required compensation); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994) (holding that city planners had the burden of showing that there was a “rough
proportionality” between the condition of the required dedication of a portion of the property for
flood control and traffic improvements and the particular harm caused by the proposed
development).
223. Murr, 137 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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in American law not recognized in India and Australia. This results in
very different placements along our Continuum for each of the three
jurisdictions.
Each of the three jurisdictions considered here reveal variable
methods of balancing the need to meet justice costs with the protection
of private property. In Diagram 2, we place the three jurisdictions along
the Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property Continuum. The
placement of each nation begins with its constitutional compulsory
acquisition provision and is subject to movement based upon judicial
and legislative interpretation and application of that provision.

Diagram 2. Positions of India, Australia, and the United States on
the Justice Needs-Protection of Private Property Continuum
The United States focusses primarily on the limitation on the
takings power, and treats it as an individual right, thereby establishing
a broader ambit of protection to private property. Thus, while it might
have started somewhere around the middle of the Continuum, as did
Australia, judicial interpretation has pushed much further towards the
protection of private property end. Armed with the power of judicial
review and backed in many cases by a strong public commitment to
property rights, the courts have enforced the constitutional restraints on
the exercise of the government’s power of eminent domain. Property
may be taken only for “public use” and with “just compensation.”
Although the public use requirement was relaxed in the interest of
facilitating improvements in infrastructure and in response to the
government’s expansive exercise of its police power, the courts have
remained vigilant in enforcing the requirement of just compensation.
To prevent uncompensated government takings, the courts recognized
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actions for inverse condemnation. And to prevent the uncompensated
deprivation of property rights by excessive government regulations, the
courts recognized regulatory takings and scrutinized the fairness of
specific requirements.
Australia provides seemingly extensive federal government
control, focusing on the power compulsorily to acquire rather than the
limitation on that power. While section 51(xxxi) would seemingly
place the Australian position somewhere at the middle of the Justice
Needs-Private Property Continuum, the consistent interpretation of the
provision by the High Court, treating it as a strong grant of power, tends
to move it in the direction of stronger provision for meeting justice
costs. So, too, does the treatment of the limitation as acting to restrain
legislative activity as opposed to an individual right, although some
protection remains for private property when the exercise of such
power enlivens the just terms guarantee. The High Court has
accomplished this position through the use of a very wide definition of
property coupled with a close textual reading of “just terms” and
“purpose in respect of which” contained in section 51(xxxi), such that
many acquisitions which would constitute a taking if dealt with in the
United States, are considered acceptable adjustments of private
property rights in Australia. This results in what might otherwise
appear to a be a placement at the middle of our Continuum to an
oscillation around the middle range of that Continuum, moving from
greater protection for the interests of the community through the
Commonwealth power compulsorily to acquire property to greater
protection for individual private property, depending upon the purpose
(pursuant to the exercise of a Commonwealth legislative power) in
respect of which the property is acquired.
India reveals a third position on the Continuum, close to that of
Australia, but arrived at through the joint action of both the judicial and
the legislative branches of the Indian federal government. What is
unique about the Indian placement is that while the ostensible rationale
for its position on the state power end—that such acquisitions are for
public purposes—the true rationale is quite different: rather than for
public purposes, the underlying reality behind such acquisitions is elite
economic interest. India’s placement, then, demonstrates two important
points about the Continuum. On the one hand, both the judiciary and
the legislature can shift a jurisdiction’s position on the Continuum.
More importantly, though, on the other hand, it demonstrates how such
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shifts of position may appear to be for one reason, but in fact be for
quite different purposes altogether.
Examining and therefore placing India, Australia, and the United
States along our Continuum proves a valuable exercise, for two
reasons. First, and most obviously, it allows for a deeper consideration
of the ways in which a state may act so as to meet the minimal justice
requirements for its citizens through the re-distribution of private
property. While we find that every state attempts to achieve some
minimal level of justice in the allocation of goods and resources, the
priority attached to this function, and the reasons given for exercising
it, are often very different. This in turn has implications for the strength
of a correlative individual right to private property. And, second, the
exercise of plotting these three jurisdictions along our Continuum
demonstrates how a similar exercise is possible with any state’s law of
compulsory acquisition.
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